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Abstract
The two great powers of Asia are arming. And it is not clear why.
1. The Indian Military
1.1. Introduction
With the almost universal preoccupation 
with the Chinese expansion and moderniza-
tion of its armed forces, it is easy to overlook 
the major modernization of the military forces 
of India.  Yet India has 1.3 million troops on 
active duty, backed by 2.3 million reserve forc-
es, making it the second largest standing army 
in the world in terms of personnel.  The Indian 
Navy, which may be the most important of the 
military services, has already been significant-
ly expanded, and its 65,000 personnel on ac-
tive duty makes it the fifth largest navy in the 
world.  Similarly, the expansion of the Indian 
Air Force to about 170,000 personnel makes it 
the fourth largest air force in the world.
The Indian government, at great cost, is 
pursuing a major modernization program in-
volving all aspects of its forces from command 
and control to force structural modernization, 
major upgradings of weapons, new unit mis-
sions, new training objectives and new com-
munications technology.  It faces problems of 
money, uncertain political backing and a lot of 
confusion over who they may be fighting and 
why.
Traditionally, the great opponent of the In-
dian military has been seen as Pakistan, and 
conflict with the Pakistani army is constant, 
ranging from small border insults to threats 
of nuclear holocaust.  India and Pakistan 
have been in major conflict with each other 
over Kashmir for almost 60 years.  Wars were 
fought in 1948 and 1965, and again in 1971 
when India supported East Pakistan in the 70s 
with both diplomatic and military assistance 
against Pakistan, to help it become Bangla-
desh. India is still fighting three anti-terrorist 
wars in Kashmir, the Maoist Naxalites in north 
east India, and against Pakistan and Bangla-
desh which support rebel groups in Assam. 
In November, a large, well organized group of 
terrorists attacked targets in Mumbai killing 
many, destroying property, and terrorizing the 
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population.  India is convinced that this attack 
was sponsored and supported by the Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), and 
it once again seriously damaged some hopeful 
peace negotiations at the time and is regarded 
as a mortal insult that will not soon be forgot-
ten. The great fear for the future seems to be 
China, and the more the Chinese rattle their sa-
bers, the more hysterical the Indians become. 
But one of the dominating problems which the 
Indians are reluctant to discuss is the fact that 
they have never been able to develop a satis-
factory “military/industrial complex” and they 
are heavily dependent on the Russians, the 
Americans and others to provide them with 
modern weapons.  In the last analysis, India’s 
strategy seems mostly internal and defensive, 
and it is hard to see its military as ominous or 
threatening.  India’s political and military pre-
occupation continues to be Pakistan, and this 
relationship has made little sense for 60 years. 
All other foreign players – Russia, China, the 
U. S. and even Japan – are first and foremost 
measured by their relationship with Pakistan, 
and then, collaterally, with India itself.  It is 
a game which nobody seems to know how to 
play, and each has its own set of rules.
India’s strategic situation makes it hard to 
conceive of a major land based conflict with 
China over the mountain barriers that sepa-
rate them.  First of all, it is hard to conceive 
why China would ever consider invasion at all. 
Second, the mountains make such an invasion 
very difficult, with impossible supply lines, 
and terrain relatively easy to defend.  An op-
tion for invasion might be for China to come 
through Pakistan, but this would be impos-
sible if Pakistan were not an ally.  Even if it 
were, the first point still applies – what could 
China hope to achieve even with a successful 
invasion of India?  The same realities apply in 
reverse for India versus China and Pakistan. 
It is also probably true that the deterioration 
of Pakistan and its own internal conflicts have 
substantially reduced the likelihood of any se-
rious offensive against India. In the end, of-
fensives by the land forces of all three coun-
tries are marginalized, and their main roles 
are defensive and internal. In addition, the in-
ternational community would bring enormous 
pressure against all three countries if insanity 
threatened to take over.
1.2. Indian Ministry of Defense
Responsibility for national defense lies with 
the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 
chaired by the Prime Minister.  India’s military 
command has no joint defense staff or unified 
command apparatus.  The Minister of Defense 
and the ministry provide management and 
operational control over the three main ser-
vices1. There are important inter service orga-
nizations such as the Services Headquarters, 
Production Establishments, and R & D orga-
nizations—plus a Finance Division.  A major 
study in 2000 resulted in recommendations 
– being implemented – to establish a Defense 
Procurement Board, a Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Defense University, a 
Strategic Forces Command, and an integrated 
headquarters in the Ministry of Defense.  To 
enhance military planning, the Ministry of De-
fense (MOD) has created the Defense Coordi-
nation and Implementation Committee, and 
the Defense Planning Staff.  All of these steps 
seem highly desirable, but what one wonders 
is why they have been so long in coming.
The Union Ministry of Home Affairs con-
trols the nationwide Indian Police Service, 
most of the paramilitary forces, and the inter-
nal intelligence bureaus. It includes the Cen-
tral Bureau of Investigation (reporting to the 
Dept. of Personnel), the Central Industrial Se-
curity Force, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Po-
lice.  The separatist insurgencies, drug inter-
diction problems, and community unrest have 
led to a stronger role for paramilitary forces 
under the direction of the Home Ministry. 
Unfortunately, these paramilitary forces have 
a bad reputation for civil rights abuses.  Each 
state has its own police force, reporting to a 
1 Wikipedia:  Indian Army; Indian Air Force; In-
dian Navy; Paramilitary Forces of India.  See also 
Global Security, Ministry of Defense.
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Director General (Police), and state forces are 
provided in the districts.  The prison system is 
entirely state operated.
A Department of Defense Production was 
set up in 1962 after the disastrous war with 
China to shape up all defense procurement, 
and it was later merged with the Department 
of Defense Supplies in 1984. The basic policy 
is to move almost completely to domestic pro-
duction of all needs.  Presently 39 ordnance 
factories and 8 Defense Production Service 
Units (DPSUs) are in operation, but much is 
purchased from civilian suppliers.  The Ord-
nance Factories (OF) are government owned 
and run by the Ministry of Defense.  They 
produce ammunition, explosives, weapons, 
vehicles both regular and armored, and other 
ordnance equipment and maintenance.  The 
8 DPSUs are:  Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.; 
Bharat Electronics; Bharat Earth Movers; 
Mazagon Dock Ltd.; Garden Reach Shipbuild-
ers and Engineers Ltd.; Boa Shipyard Ltd.; 
Bharat Dynamics Ltd.; Mishra Dhatu Nigam 
Ltd.
The government has only recently begun 
to urge the private sector into the armaments 
market, presumably to try and split the costs, 
but so far, the private sector has been permit-
ted only marginal participation through the 
provision of  raw materials, semi-finished 
parts, components, services and some mainte-
nance, which means that they contribute little 
to more sophisticated weapons systems R & D. 
FDI in any defense activity is limited to 26% 
The size of the budget is difficult to assess. 
The official military budget excludes military 
pensions (15% of actual total outlay), the Coast 
Guard, the nuclear weapons arsenal, and the 
huge paramilitary forces.  All things consid-
ered including PPP calculations, the military 
budget is about $ 100 billion2. The terrorist 
attacks on Mumbai in 2008, also terrorized 
2 OpenSalon.com.  Report of the Indian Defense 
Budget, Feb. 7, 2010.  See also GlobalSecurity 
“Military Budget”. See also Medhani in The Tra-
jectory, “India’s Defense Spending: Facts Beyond 
the Figures”, July, 2010.
the political parties who had been very slug-
gish about the cost of modernization, and as 
a result, the military asked for and got a 34% 
increase in its main operating funds for 2009. 
India is the second largest weapons importer 
after the Chinese, which is a reflection not 
only of the desire to upgrade equipment, but 
also the inability to produce high technology 
weaponry domestically.  Recent purchases of 
new items include the Adm. Gorshkov aircraft 
carrier purchased from the Russians, plus an-
other new carrier now being built by a Russian 
shipyard.  India is also purchasing upgraded 
versions of Sukoi strike fighters from the Rus-
sians, plus Mirage fighters, Hawk trainers, 
submarines, multiple unit rocket launchers, 
light helicopters, long range artillery, plane-
based radar, and increased funding for R & D. 
Funds are also included in the budget for the 
start of deployment of short range – 700 km 
Agni – I surface-to-surface missiles, and the 
intermediate range - 2,000 km Agni – II mis-
siles.  The Army is also seeking development 
of a “weapon locating “radar.  The military is 
also seeking new “anti-terrorism” weapons 
– whatever that means.  One of the most sig-
nificant ways to redirect military expenditures 
would be to do what the Chinese did: radically 
cut back on the very large numbers of infantry 
troops and reinvest the money saved into high 
technology weaponry.  This is especially true 
because, as a result of a recent Sixth Pay Com-
mission report, major increases in pay, ben-
efits and pensions will add large sums to an 
already tight budget.  India can scarcely afford 
its very large standing army and paramilitary 
forces, but it seems extremely hard to reduce 
units with such grand traditions.
The Iraq war proved to be a great surprise 
to military planners and procurement officials 
because of it demonstrated the great supe-
riority of U. S. vs. Russian weapons systems 
which are heavily relied upon in the Indian 
armed forces.  There is a growing feeling that 
scarce military funds will be better spent on U. 
S. and other western country weaponry.  This 
fits in with other tides running in Indian for-
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eign affairs – the decline of the Soviet Union 
as a potential ally, the surge of concern over 
the rise of China and its military moderniza-
tion program, the decline of Pakistan, and the 
fact that the “on again, off again” relationship 
with the United States seems again to be “on”. 
This is especially true because the Indian R 
& D community which was supposed to key 
the development of Indian domestic weapons 
development capability seems to have prom-
ised much, but delivered little.  Soviet weap-
ons systems were often disappointing, lacking 
promised performance and often proving to 
be of poor quality and reliability.  Many Soviet 
suppliers have gone out of business and been 
replaced with post Soviet owners and manag-
ers, but some sources of replacement/repair 
parts have been lost, and it seems hard for 
Indian enterprises to fill these gaps.  But still, 
the major purchases being made remain heav-
ily oriented toward Russian sources which are 
still said to supply over 50% of India’s military 
hardware.
1.3. The Indian Army
The Indian Army numbers over 1.4 million 
troops on active service plus more than two 
million reserve troops, making it the second 
largest standing army in the world and  it is 
almost all volunteer and has long been able to 
maintain a large number of permanent long 
serving troops as its core (Global Security 
2009). But pay is low, morale is often poor, 
discipline is often weak, and there is a growing 
pattern of accusations of corruption.  It also 
seems true that fewer young men are enlisting, 
more are opting out, and even appointments to 
the Indian Military Academy are less sought. 
But still, the government is attempting to find 
ways to modernize Army weaponry.  Indian 
armored units, which have performed well 
against the Pakistan Army are being beefed 
up with the purchase of more than 1,600 new 
T-90 main battle tanks from Russian sources, 
along with more than 4,000 Milan 2T anti-
tank guided missiles.  It has been involved 
in four wars with Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971, 
and 1999) of which it can be said it won three. 
It has fought one war against the Chinese in 
1962, which was a military disaster, and led 
to a new emphasis on military modernization 
that is still progressing slowly.  It usually fields 
about 36 divisions, 97 armored regiments with 
more than 3,200 main battle tanks, 3,200 ar-
tillery pieces, 1,500 aircraft, and more than 
2,000 battle field ballistic missiles.  The Chi-
nese realized, in the post Maoist period that 
its huge army was far larger – and far more 
expensive – than the country needed or could 
support, and it has spent 25 years reducing 
the size of its standing army and re-equipping 
the remaining forces.  It is felt that perhaps 
India is facing the same problems, and they it 
may need to decide to trim back its standing 
forces, so that the money saved could be used 
to finance modernization.  As with the other 
services, most of the Army’s weapons are im-
ported, but there are more small arms and am-
munition being produced domestically. 
1.4. The Indian Navy
It may well be that the most important ser-
vice in the Indian military is not the Army, 
with its huge forces and glorious traditions, 
but the Navy because it has a series of contem-
porary missions to perform, and more flex-
ibility in its deployment.   It would be the first 
line of defense if any country attempted either 
invasion or attack against the homeland.  It 
would be the only feasible weapon of offense 
against another county if needed.  It can and 
will play a critical role in either blockading or 
keeping open vital shipping lanes in the whole 
of Southeast Asia.  And it has already estab-
lished a solid record of offering help to other 
nations in the area such as its excellent record 
against Indian Ocean pirates operating out of 
East Africa.  
The Indian Navy currently has about 65,000 
personnel on active duty, and that makes it 
the fifth largest navy in the world in terms of 
personnel.  It has about 150 ships, including 
one aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 15 subma-
rines, 37 frigates and corvettes, and about 250 
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aircraft of all kinds.  It operates mainly out of 
three naval bases at Goa and Karwar on the 
west coast about 400 miles south of Mumbai, 
and at Visakapatnam on the east coast about 
400 miles north of Chennai. 
The Indian Navy has always had one aircraft 
carrier in service starting with one purchased 
from the British in 1963 and running thru 
three replacements or retrofits.  The current 
INS Vikrant has been in service since 1987, 
and is due for retirement in 2012 – but may 
be kept in some adapted role. But in direct re-
sponse to constant Chinese rumblings about 
building a carrier, the Indians have done two 
things:
They purchased the aircraft carrier Adm. 
Gorshkov from Russia and it is currently be-
ing refitted in India for service “soon” (this is 
a valuable learning process for Indian techni-
cians)
The Indians signed a contract in 2005 for 
design and construction of an entirely new 
modern carrier which is being built by the 
Russians.
When these actions are completed, India 
will have two and possibly three carriers in 
operation and they will be the only carriers 
possessed by any Asian nation.  The key to the 
military balance of power in S. E. Asia will then 
lie with the ability of the Indian Navy to oper-
ate three powerful aircraft carrier groups car-
rying the best military aircraft in the region, 
and contracts have been signed for purchase 
of 16 more MiG 29s, and there are apparently 
plans for purchase of  an additional 29.  This is 
very important; it represents the kind of force 
projection that the Chinese do not have. The 
capacity of the Indian Navy to disrupt supply 
lines and blockade the ports of other countries 
is very great, and could be devastating.  The 
Navy has 8 destroyers, 13 frigates and 24 cor-
vettes which are capable of independent op-
erations but are critical as the carrier escort 
vessels in aircraft carrier groups.
The Indian Navy has 16 submarines only 
one of which is nuclear powered– but at any 
given time only about 6 are operational. They 
are diesel powered and obsolete by interna-
tional standards. Half of these subs are ap-
proaching 22-23 years old, with a supposed 
life cycle of 30 years.  General plans seem to 
be to start to replace these at the rate of 2 per 
year, and six are already scheduled, but it not 
certain that this schedule can be maintained. 
Training, refitting, maintenance and upgrad-
ing capabilities all seem very limited and dif-
ficult.  India keeps saying that it wants to be 
self sufficient in weapons systems production, 
but in fact they seem technically to be another 
generation away, and meanwhile it keeps buy-
ing ships from the Russians, with more frig-
ates and submarines to be purchased soon.   In 
fact, one of the Navy’s most serious problems 
is the talent shortage, both in the service and 
in its supporting military industrial complex. 
The Navy has been very dependent on mili-
tary state owned enterprises because of long 
standing government policy of import sub-
stitution, and the domestic private sector has 
been largely excluded from the more techno-
logically sophisticated systems3.
This may change. India is trying to build up 
its skill base, the Russians are increasingly re-
luctant to supply its top level technology, and 
the U. S. and other countries such as France, 
Israel, Japan and Brazil are ready to step into 
any gap, and appear more willing to share 
their technology knowledge.
1.5. The Indian Air Force
India’s air force is the world’s fourth largest 
with about 170,000 personnel and over 1,300 
aircraft, including over 600 combat aircraft 
and more than 500 transports and helicop-
ters operating out of more than 60 airbases 
around the country4. Its newest plane is the 
multi-role Sukhoi 30 which are obtained from 
Russia, and are capable of delivering strategic 
weapons. It now also operates a large number 
of MiG 29s and Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft 
which have advanced electronics permitting 
night operation.  MiG 27 aircraft are deployed 
3 Wikipedia, “Indian Navy”.
4 Wikipedia, “Indian Air Force”.
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for ground attack and ground support mis-
sions.  The air force has many older MIG 21s 
which it wants to replace with a domestically 
produced light combat aircraft.  Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) is major domestic air-
craft manufacturer and it currently produces 
many of the Russian aircraft in India under 
license.  It also produces several helicopters, 
and is designing the HAL Tejas domestically 
as the replacement for the obsolete MiG 21s.
The Indian Air Force is also responsible for 
the defense of the country against air attack, 
and it is moving to upgrade its land-based de-
tection electronics and its ground to air mis-
sile systems, including the use of mobile mis-
sile trailers.  It is also deploying three of the 
Phalcon Airborne Earl Warning radar system 
obtained from Israel Aerospace Industries 
considered among the best in the world.  The 
Air Force also operates a large number of 
transport aircraft which gives it superior air-
lift capability.
1.6. Paramilitary Forces of India
The military capability of India is support-
ed by an extraordinary complex of police and 
semi-military organizations grouped under 
the general heading of the Paramilitary Forces 
of India (Global Security, 2010). The first and 
most important level of such forces is the Cen-
tral Police Organizations which function as a 
national police force for the State, dealing with 
a whole range of law enforcement matters 
ranging from insurrections to parades.  These 
organizations include the State Armed Police, 
which is highly mobile and well armed force of 
more than 450,000 troops, and functions in-
dependent of the military, reporting to civilian 
bosses.  It is supported and reinforced by the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which is 
a volunteer force with more than 300,000 ac-
tive members, plus a Home Guard and Civil 
Defense forces with almost one million more 
members.  The Central Reserve Police Force 
also maintains a Rapid Action Force and the 
Anti-Riot Police to deal with particularly vio-
lent threats, and a new 10,000 man Rapid Ac-
tion Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) is 
being formed under the CRPF specifically to 
deal with the Naxalite Maoist insurgents in 
northeast India.
At a next level are the Central Paramilitary 
Forces which are linked more closely with 
the Indian Army, and during wartime, would 
serve directly under the armed forces chain of 
command.  It includes such units as the Coast 
Guard, the Border Security Force, the Central 
Industrial Security Force, the Tibetan Border 
Police, and many other special purpose units. 
The total population of all of these units ex-
ceeds 8.7 million troops.  All of these organi-
zations are headed by a senior Indian Police 
Service Officer apparently to provide some co-
herent leadership to a very complex array of 
military and police establishments, which are 
hugely expensive.
India’s military modernization is about a lot 
more than weapons.  The military establish-
ment suffers from weak planning, lack of coher-
ent command and control, obsolete structure 
both of fighting units and support commands, 
and a lot of disagreement and uncertainty as 
to who “the enemy” really is, and what strate-
gic objectives should be followed.  There is a 
genuine but highly dysfunctional difference of 
philosophy between an assertive military and 
national leadership that has long believed in 
a more peaceful and passive national posture. 
There is a strong movement in the country that 
sees the military as overly aggressive, unduly 
expensive, and largely misdirected.  Thus, the 
civilian leadership favors “strategic restraint”, 
a defensive stance and the hope of a nuclear 
umbrella, with a “no first strike” philosophy, 
as precluding the possibility of any real war. 
One role that both can agree on is the growing 
importance of the need for counter insurgen-
cy.  But this has been largely the responsibility 
of the police, and only recently has the army 
stepped in, but with unsavory accusations of 
excessive brutality.
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2. The Chinese Military
2.1. Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) holds a 
special place of honor in China as its liberator, 
its protector, the stalwart defender of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP) and the guard-
ian of the Revolution. Despite this honored 
position, the PLA has suffered from a strange-
ly rocky history of alternating support and ne-
glect, and has spent the last 20 years attempt-
ing to recoup its position from the mistakes 
of it’s past.  It was both neglected and ill-used 
for 20 years by the Maoist regime. It’s strate-
gies were muddled, its equipment obsolete, its 
funding has been uncertain, its officer corps is 
underpaid and under trained, and its troops 
are a non-professional transient population. 
In the 80s it was authorized to create or ac-
quire state owned enterprises (SOEs) and oth-
er businesses in the hope that it could largely 
finance itself and save the political leadership 
from the necessity of raising more taxes.  This 
policy was a disaster for both the PLA and the 
Chinese economy from which both are still la-
boriously recovering.
Military affairs are naturally highly politi-
cal, and they are under the direction of the 
Central Military Commission (CMC), an ex-
traordinarily powerful body that is chaired 
by the CCP General Secretary, who is also the 
head of the CCP and formal leader of the gov-
ernment and the country.  The CMC has three 
vice chairmen, one of whom is the prime min-
ister, plus seven other members who are the 
most senior military officers. It has four gen-
eral departments:  General Staff, Logistics, Ar-
maments, and Political Affairs.  The country is 
divided into 7 Regional Military Districts, and 
the PLA itself has five field Commands:  Army 
(PLA), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), the 
Second Artillery (which is the nuclear mis-
sile command), and the Peoples Armed Police 
(PAP), which is officially under the dual com-
mand of the State Council and the CMC, but is 
generally considered to be an integral part of 
the military establishment.
The strategic thinking of the CMC and the 
PLA has been almost entirely defensive ex-
cept for Taiwan. Its major stated policies are 
first and foremost to defend the CCP, then to 
defend industrial centers, defend the capitol 
of Beijing, guard the borders and potential 
avenues of attack, protect key elements such 
as transport routes, lines of communication, 
harbors, and power sources; and to secure key 
locations providing internal security. None of 
these policies specifically emphasize the de-
fense of the Chinese people. 
But the new leadership of China has now 
fully committed itself to genuine and compre-
hensive modernization and expansion of its 
military capability. The authority of the PLA is 
wide open and its role is defined at any given 
time by the views of the political leadership.  It 
is pursuing several major modernization pro-
grams:  reduction in troop numbers, creation 
of medium and long range missile capabil-
ity, an expanded and updated Air Force and 
Navy,  creation of “multi-role” military units 
with rapid deployment capability, an upgrad-
ed command/field communications network, 
and an air defense system, and a coastal de-
fense capability with naval and shore forces. 
But troop concentrations seem not to have 
changed much in 20 years and they are still 
deployed opposite Taiwan, along the Russian 
border, and in Tibet and Xinjiang.
As with so much else in the modern history 
of the Chinese, the death of Mao in 1976 broke 
the pattern of neglect and stagnation and per-
mitted the CCP leadership to initiate a long, 
complex and multi-faceted reform of the PLA 
which, 30 years later, is still under way.
Essentially three major arenas of reform 
were therefore considered vital:
First, the whole military establishment had 
to be “downsized” on a grand scale in terms 
of personnel, and its organizational structure 
had to be simplified and made more efficient 
and productive.  It had to get rid of old obso-
lete types of forces, mainly massive ground 
units, so that it could afford new units more 
relevant to the nature of modern warfare.
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Second, every aspect of PLA operations 
had to be modernized from new field com-
munications, to weapons systems design and 
acquisition, to logistics, supply and transport 
and even to financial responsibility and con-
trol. An important policy was enunciated by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1985:  the military should 
concentrate on modernization through R & D; 
but it was not necessary to then manufacture 
new weapons unless the actual military situa-
tion requires them.  This is the same pattern 
that makes sense in the U. S. since R & D is 
relatively cheap, and manufacture is very ex-
pensive, especially with technologies that tend 
to become obsolete quickly.  The difference 
for China is that, in many disciplines, Chinese 
education and technological development had 
never really developed, and this limits the 
skills available for military upgrades.
Third, the government made a decision 
about 1985 that probably seemed smart at the 
time, but which ultimately proved to be a di-
saster.  The PLA was authorized to enter into 
business in a big way to create or acquire state 
owned enterprises (SOE) and other business-
es.  The political reasoning at the time was that 
the central government budget could not af-
ford both the PLA and funds for economic de-
velopment, so the PLA was largely cut loose to 
finance itself.  The basic intent of authorizing 
PLA business activities was very quickly per-
verted. At its peak, the PLA controlled 30,000 
SOEs employing 3 million workers. There was 
almost no accounting for either income or ex-
penditure, and these commercial operations 
were a serious cause of corruption, including 
the diversion of military assets (such as trucks, 
fuel, food and labor) to its businesses.  In many 
cases such as electronics or certain minerals, 
the PLA enterprises dominated whole sectors 
of the economy. The whole complex structure 
continues to suffer from the usual sins of cor-
ruption, patronage and incompetence, and it 
is likely that any development of major weap-
ons systems, will take 12-15 years to complete, 
even if it is pursued steadily and not interrupt-
ed with funding shortages or political chang-
es of mind.  Only in the 90’s did the Chinese 
appear to discover systems management and 
competitive bidding, and it is not clear how far 
they have advanced.
Despite years of hand wringing, it was not 
until 1999 that the political leadership finally 
got serious about this elaborate mess.  The 
point had been reached where both the mili-
tary and the political leadership realized that 
this PLA commercial activity was a failure. 
The essence of the agreement that emerged 
was that the government promised to substi-
tute regular appropriated funds for the loss of 
SOE revenues, and the newly acquired wealth 
from the market economy made it feasible 
to promise the PLA adequate funding for the 
future.  The PLA leadership recognized this 
was a good face saver, since most of its SOEs 
were operating at a loss, despite their subsi-
dies.  Therefore they could dump the failed 
commercial enterprises, return their officers 
to military roles, clean up much of the corrup-
tion, and assure a reasonable flow of funds for 
modernization.  So the deal was struck. 
But it is clear from subsequent events that 
the PLA and the rest of the government nev-
er really got out of the enterprise game.  At 
present, it appears that there are still about 
10,000 enterprises employing 700,000 work-
ers under PLA control.  There are about 2000 
SOE’s that are  genuinely defense related, but 
there remain many others that are for mixed 
military/civilian production.  For example, the 
Aviation Industries of China, which produces 
both civilian and military aircraft is in fact a 
large holding company that includes more 
than 200 enterprises and trading companies 
and employs more than 500,000 people, of 
whom 200,000 are engineers and technicians 
(Shambaugh, 2004).  
The other big source of PLA revenue is 
weapons sales.  The PLA is reported to still 
own or control dozens of major SOEs that pro-
duce weapons for export (Shambaugh 2004)5. 
5 See also Frankenstein, John, and Bates, Gill, 
“Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese 
Defense Industries”, in Shambaugh, David, and 
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Most of the weapons sales have been to inter-
national “bad guys” in the eyes of Western na-
tions: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Cuba, 
Sudan, Pakistan and of course N. Korea.  But 
predictions that Chinese aid would allow Iran 
to have nuclear weapons by 2000 were obvi-
ously exaggerated.  In fact, the Chinese seemed 
to have been aiding Iran for 25 years to little 
effect.  
In the fall of 2002, the State Council and the 
Central Military Commission directed local 
governments at all levels to include provision 
of “rear services” costs for the military estab-
lishment which allowed the PLA to reduce its 
own budgets.  In addition, local governments 
bear some/all of the cost of military reserve 
units.
Adequate accounting procedures were not 
available until well into the 90s when the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) developed stan-
dards which the PLA is required to use.  Also, 
the MOF began serious budget reviews with 
a Zero Based Budgeting approach requiring 
more line item information and more account 
auditing.  Thousands of PLA accounts were off 
budget, and much of the PLA budget was (and 
still is) concealed in other types of accounts. 
Huge debt levels were revealed – so substan-
tial that they endangered the banks and local 
governments that had been coerced into back-
ing the loans.  Thus, it was clear in retrospect 
that the PLA had access to huge amounts of 
money, and it is a puzzle why they got so little 
real military capability out of these funds for 
more than 40 years.
2.2. Military Reforms
When all is said and done, the PLA seri-
ously wants to be a lot smaller but a lot more 
sophisticated, versatile and more technically 
advanced.  Therefore, one major reform has 
been to shift the mix of units away from large 
ground units to more compact and multi-mis-
sion units.  The number of divisions has been 
reduced in favor of more brigade (1,000-2,500 
Yang, Richard H., Editors, Oxford University 
Press, 1997.
troops) units to add flexibility.  There are 13 
infantry, 20 artillery, and 20 tank brigades. 59 
divisions including 44 infantry, 10 tank and 
5 artillery are still active.   Efforts have been 
made to create at least one Rapid Reaction 
Unit (RRU) for each of the seven military re-
gions, but airlift is scarce, and there are only 
about 130 transport helicopters in the whole 
PLA. Thus, most rapid deployments would 
still be by rail or truck.  There are an estimated 
three RRUs actively deployed. Artillery is a big 
strength, with 30-35,000 pieces of ordnance 
of many types, including 14,000 self propelled 
howitzers of 120 to 203 mm caliber.  There are 
more than 6,000 tanks of varying age with 85-
125 mm guns (Karmel, 2000, pp. 123-154).
The PLA has about 8,300 main battle tanks 
of different ages, but all of them, even the new 
T-90s under development, are obsolete by in-
ternational standards, and those sold to Iraq 
were no match for the U. S. tanks.  The his-
tory of tank design and production is a good 
illustration of how weak the Chinese military/
industrial complex really is.  A tank designated 
the T-69 was the first tank domestically pro-
duced. It was designed about 1970, but took 
another 10 years to reach production, and was 
not deployed in any numbers until the mid 
80s by which time it was obsolete. The main 
battle tank is now considered to be the T-85, 
introduced in 1989, but it did not enter pro-
duction until 1995, and not many have yet ac-
tually been deployed to the troops (Karmel, 
2000, pp 252-255). 
The PLA has two very capable artillery 
pieces:  the 155 mm and 203 mm mobile how-
itzers.  The 203 mm howitzer has, at 50 km, 
the longest range of any weapon in the world 
but again, neither has really been built in any 
numbers.
Even before these reformed unit align-
ments, there was a serious reduction in troop 
numbers, over a 20 year period.  Reductions 
have so far totaled 1.8 million from its peak of 
4.5 million as recently as 1985 (5.5 million in 
1950), and the active Army ground troops now 
number about 1.6 million.  But in fact, many of 
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the people “reduced” have been simply rede-
ployed.  A  Reserve component has been cre-
ated, largely for Army forces, and some active 
duty personnel have been transferred to the 
Reserves which now number about 800,000. 
Some have been moved into civilian jobs in 
the PLA and others have even been assigned to 
other government ministries.  There are about 
4 million military dependents and “several 
million” civilian employees of the PLA. 
Taiwan has been the keystone to military 
policy.  The conflict with Taiwan is the only 
external situation that can be used to justify 
the high cost of the PLA.  There is no credible 
land threat, now or in the foreseeable future. 
The major strategic posture is one of coastal 
defense.  The military has virtually no force 
projection capability, beyond Taiwan. China 
wants to become the dominant regional pow-
er, and it is acting to enhance its force projec-
tion capability. About 82% of the PLA total 
forces have been 3 year conscripts.  The goals 
are to cut the conscript period to two years, 
but to reduce the percentage of conscripts to 
less than 65%.
Many personnel have been transferred 
to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), created 
in 1983, including 14 PLA divisions more or 
less intact. This reflects a significant change 
in policy following Tiananmen Square; the 
leadership wants a far larger and more heav-
ily armed internal security force to deal with 
potential civil insurrections but wants to avoid 
the visibility of using the army.  The PAP force 
which was  about 400,000 in 1982 and  around 
900,000 in the late 90’s has climbed to what 
is estimated to be about and 1.5 million today 
(the official number is just 660,000).  Its ma-
jor roles are border control, internal security, 
civil unrest, customs and anti-smuggling and 
facilities protection. But it is still not clear who 
really controls the PAP.  The CCP wants it both 
ways; they appear to want it linked to the mili-
tary establishment, but want it to appear to be 
run as a civilian function.
Major modernization of forces has occurred 
in all of the services.  Recently, most modern-
ization funding is going to the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF) and the PLA Navy (PLAN).  While 
ground forces are being upgraded, only a lim-
ited number of units will be improved; the rest 
of the Army units will be low quality.  There 
is an annual conscription program which is 
dysfunctional.  25% of all forces are one year 
people, and many of the rest have three year 
terms of service in a profession that is poorly 
paid and not very promising.  All services suf-
fer from a lack of capable NCOs.   The Navy 
has no aircraft carriers, no heavy capital ships, 
only about 25 capable subs (only one nuclear 
powered nuclear missile capable sub and that 
is in its development/testing cycle. All 6 of the 
nuclear powered subs are obsolete)6. 
The Air Force has about 420,000 personnel 
and a growing number of planes, but most are 
based on 20 year old technology. It has about 
150 first line planes including two fighter types 
bought from Russia, and one domestic plane 
based on good but 20 year old Israeli designs, 
but it has languished because of major tech-
nical problems with design, metallurgy, avi-
onics, engine technology, and generally low 
manufacturing skills and quality control.  The 
engines for the new J-18 fighter are actually 
being supplied by Sugat – a Russian compa-
ny.  More than 3,000 older aircraft (built in 
1979 or earlier) of all types are so obsolete that 
they are being decommissioned. The Russian 
SU-27 is a good but old trainer that has been 
upgraded.  The SU-30 is a good modern multi-
task fighter-bomber with a range of 1600 nau-
tical miles.  There are about 120 old but good 
Russian “Badger” heavy bombers with a range 
of about 5,900 KM, and nuclear capability. 
None of these aircraft compare well against 
American and other country aircraft.  The past 
6 The Chinese Navy has fewer than 10 nuclear sub-
marines, only one of which is armed with strategic 
ballistic missiles, and it is not operational.  It now 
has one aircraft carrier, built as an upgrade of its 
original ‘80s capability. Although the PLAN keeps 
announcing plans for the new ships, even if true, 
the actual development cycle for such systems to 
reach production continues to be more than 12-15 
years.
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reliance on Russian sources is now in ques-
tion.  Increasingly, the Russians are reluctant 
to part with new designs or production tech-
nology, fearing China not necessarily as an 
enemy but rather as a competitor as well as a 
customer, and they are now insisting on cash 
rather than bartered goods (Karmel, 200, pp. 
158-161).  The PLAAF also operates a formida-
ble Air Defense System with 220,000 air de-
fense personnel in 100 sites, with surface to air 
missiles and about 16,000 anti aircraft guns. 
There is a large early warning radar network 
with ranges up to 100 km. 
Missile forces are perhaps the strongest arm 
of the PLA, but they are still almost entirely 
ballistic.  Seven ICBM missile systems entered 
development, but four have been cancelled 
and one is an old liquid fuel system.  There are 
two modern systems:  the DF-31 with a range 
of about 7,200 km; and the DF-31A with a 
range of 11,200 km, but the inventory for each 
is very small – less than 10. There are about 
1000 air-to-air missiles, and another 1000 
land based cruise type missiles, but the maxi-
mum range for any of them is about 85 NM. 
These are Russian designs that are being up-
graded and switched to domestic production. 
The Chinese produce several short range at-
tack missiles, has sold a lot to Iran, and wants 
to sell more to developing countries.  There is 
a consolidated missile force with longer range 
missiles named “The Second Artillery”.  Long 
range missiles are really upgraded middle 
range missiles shifted from liquid to solid pro-
pellants. There are at least ten theater mis-
siles with ranges from 180 to 4,700 km. Most 
remain ballistic; and some are now equipped 
with upgraded guidance systems, but they re-
main scarce.  China has 8-900 nuclear weap-
ons, the third largest inventory in the world.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
has a total of about 250,000 personnel. It has 
been trying hard to upgrade its submarine 
fleet as an attack force.  It initiated five types 
of subs, of which two – the Type 92 Xia and 
the Type 94 Jin are nuclear capable, but nei-
ther is fully operational, and only  9-10 have 
so far been identified.   Submarine missiles 
are old and limited in numbers.  The JL-2 
has a range of 7,200 km, but apparently has 
yet to be deployed for fleet operations. It has 
only one full range nuclear powered ballistic 
missile sub, plus 5 “attack” boats with ballis-
tic missile capability.  China has a very large 
merchant marine, but many of the vessels are 
coast or river based.  It has two guided mis-
sile destroyers based on a 1990 Soviet design, 
and carrying 8 anti-ship cruise type missiles. 
It also has 2 smaller guided missile destroy-
ers and 8 smaller frigates.  All other ships in 
the Chinese navy are from the 1950’s and are 
obsolete (Shambaugh, 2006).
The current budget is estimated at about 
$36 billion, but much of the funding for the 
military establishment remains concealed.  Al-
most all R & D is carried in a separate nation-
al R & D budget category.  The costs of some 
arms imports are budgeted separately and 
mostly off budget.  The PAP is largely funded 
out of civilian accounts.  The Reserve is funded 
from provincial budgets.  A lot of the cost of 
military SOEs including deficits are covered 
by government subsidies and forced “loans” 
and the PLA has always had huge bank debts, 
much of which is not realistically expected 
to be repaid.  Many of the prices of military 
goods are deliberately understated.  There is 
a serious and deliberate lack of reliable data, 
and most of the statistical comparisons with 
world prices lack a Purchasing Power Par-
ity (PPP) assessment. In fact, there is serious 
doubt that the Chinese themselves know how 
much they spend on their military establish-
ment.  The budget in 2000 was double that of 
1978, but it has had persistent ups and downs 
– up for Korea and then down; up for the Viet-
nam War and then down.  In effect, financing 
for the military establishment as a percent of 
the national budget is not much better than in 
1978.  A substantial part of the recent increase 
is to bring pay for both officers and men up 
to some reasonable standard after decades of 
underpayment.   The quality of personnel has, 
for 30 years or more been poor since the mili-
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tary is not an attractive career.  In addition, 
there is a track record of bad maintenance, a 
shortage of spare parts, and low performance 
reliability.
“China’s reported 17.5% increase in its de-
fense budget still leaves it a fraction of what 
the US spends each year on its armed forces. 
President Bush’s last budget requested $515 
billion for FY 2009 – a 7.5% increase – plus 
$70 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan.”  The Obama Administration DOD bud-
get for 2014 is $526 billion, down slightly from 
its peak of $530 billion in 2012. 
A spokesman for the Chinese National Peo-
ple’s Congress said that defense spending has 
increased at an annual average of 15.8% in the 
last 5 years, and while this seems ominous to 
some observers, it is actually less than the in-
crease in general government revenues which 
have increased an average of 22.1%.  He noted 
that the defense budget is equivalent of 1.4% of 
GDP, while the US spends at 4.6% and Britain 
spends 3%.  He also stated that much of the 
increase was for higher military salaries, more 
training and rising oil costs rather than new 
weapons.  However the Pentagon still manag-
es to brood about nuclear force modernization 
and new high tech missiles. 
Here again, as with India, the Chinese gov-
ernment is utterly preoccupied with prepara-
tions for a war that will never happen, against 
an enemy that does not exist.  None of the 
conflicts that seem to drive military policy – 
against the U. 
S.; against Japan; against Pakistan; against 
Russia; seem even remotely probable. Military 
leaders in both countries ominously overstate 
the risks because such overstatements are 
hypocritically accepted by the political leader-
ship as justification for authorizing more re-
sources for their military establishments.  
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